Podcast: My Conversation With the National Youth Federation for Development in Haiti

Fighting for Haiti by aus10

Recently, I had a conversation with Ernst Louis and Gilles Sassine of the Haitian grassroots organization, National Youth Federation for Development. Ernst, Gilles and their colleagues were among the first responders after the disaster beginning 2 hours after the earthquake in January that took the lives of over 200,000 people. Founded in 2004, the organization is currently managing 50 camps in Haiti serving over 147,000 people. They need our help to raise financial and material resources for their camps as the threat of a new hurricane season this summer could totally devastate Haiti if proper precautions are not taken immediately. Please, listen to this podcast and get involved. You can find the facebook page of the National Youth Federation by clicking here.

Will the Real Pan-Africanists Please Stand-Up?

Senegal's president Abdoulaye Wade calls him self a Pan-Africanist. He offered to give land to Haitians who lost their homes in the recent earth quake. In April, he will unveil a new statue dedicated to what he calls the "African Renaissance". However, Wade's policies of neo-liberal privatization, demagoguery against his political opponents and his outrageous attempts to win the favor of foreign investors and Western presidents are the polar opposite of what revolutionary leaders discussed at the 6th Pan-African Congress, when the last wave of African liberation movements were struggling against neo-colonialism. Wade, and the other presidents who share similarly right-wing visions for Africa, are impotent against ramped corruption and extreme ethnic and religious violence happening in Africa today. The major reason why is that their visions of Pan-Africanism or African Renaissance draw their strength from the institutional foundations of neo-colonialism.

During European colonialism, traditional or customary ethnic and religious identities were politically exaggerated by racists to legitimize their own dominance in Africa. Colonizers realized early on that by capitalizing on the cultural and historical Native Authorities of rural Africa they could put a local face on external domination and pit traditional factions against one another. This system of indirect rule thrived in an atmosphere of "divide and conquer" where ruthless competition between identities for a piece of the pie kept colonialism in tact. Even after the European powers, exhausted by World War II, decided to grant political independence to their colonies, many African countries chose to maintain the same colonial-type institutions that politicized ethnic and religious differences.

Today, ethnic and religious groups in rural Africa desperately jostle for political authority or economic gains from mineral riches, fertile lands, and increasingly scarce water resources. Far from the romanticized conceptions of African Renaissance with aborigines beating tom-toms, dancing half-naked, and eating mangos, over half of rural Africa is consumed by ruthless competitions between extremely poor people organizing on essentialist conceptions of their identities. Armed with automatic machine guns, machetes, or voting ballots these groups fight to protect the interests of the friends who worship as they worship or the distant cousins who can their bio-cultural origins to a common ancestor, all while working to eliminate competitors. These remarkably static conceptions of identity are not natural but the result of very specific political cultures that emerged as a result of Western social engineering.

The current un-governability and divisiveness of much of rural Africa plays directly into the hands of Western economic powers who take more than their fair share of Africa's wealth. On the one hand, the historical fragmentation of the post-colonial state along ethnic or religious lines has prevented the emergence of national, broad-based political and social movements that can demand fast-track redistribution of lands and mineral wealth to the countryside. As we have seen in the unfolding "Bolivarian Revolution" in Latin America, the U.S. government believes that the ultimate challenge to domination of its "own backyard" is national democratic and popular alliances organized around distributional rather than nativist political cultures.

More importantly, in keeping with classical liberal economics, imperialists (governments who actively support or practice the act of imperalism) benefit from a central government that is too weak to regulate multinational corporations in remote areas where the raw mineral resources being extracted or to ensure the revenues from the resources are being taxed to fund public services. A central African government that is constantly threatened by ego-tripping rebels scrambling for power or working to satisfy the interests of religious brotherhoods is an enthusiastic customer for military weapons sales or potential dependent on aid.

There were radical nationalists like Julius Nyere, Kwame Nkrumah, Amilcar Cabral and Samora Machel who explicitly attempted to de-legitimize Native Authority and unite the most oppressed sectors of their countries under national liberation movements for social and economic justice. These leaders originally mobilized heterogeneous movements in solidarity that could dismantle the institutions of colonial rule and isolate traditional African elites who empowered them. Furthermore, they advocated the direct takeover of the commanding heights of the economy including the technologies responsible for the extraction of strategic natural resources and agricultural production---a step taken to ensure as broad a program of poverty eradication as possible. The combination of these two events resulted in direct confrontations with the combined forces of Western military might and economic isolation but also internal opposition from conservative Native Authorities. After the implosion of the Soviet Union and de-radicalization of Communist China these rebellious African regimes lost their main sources of technical and financial assistance.

Despite their eventual defeat, radical nationalists in Africa did leave behind one major victory---national political identity. For example, Tanzania is among the few territorially large African countries that has not seen essentialist identity politics spill-over into extreme violent conflict. Ugandan political scientist Mahmood Mamdani has spoken about the nationalist legacy of Julius Nyere in Tanzania pointing out, "the success of Tanzania as a nation that is getting it right the continent is because the nation's erstwhile leader, Julius Nyerere, during his tenure dismantled the customary law, thereby making every one a Tanzanian citizen." Radical nationalism sought to do the very difficult task of changing rural dwellers perceptions about political legitimacy.

The demonization of African leaders who supported "left-wing" political views and policies that emphasized economic sovereignty and sweeping agrarian transformation of society always takes outside of the context of contemporary African politics where genocide and religious fundamentalism exist side-by-side with crippling social injustices. And when discussing genocide and religious fundamentalism, the exact inverse is true. Commentary on violent ethnic or religious factions are taken out of the context of a documented imperialist strategy of neutralizing any political movement that sought to unite citizens under bold agendas for radical social change.

I am involved with the Pan-African Youth Summit 2010 in Dakar that is trying to organize a new coalition of grassroots "left" organizations united in the reconstruction of a legitimate Pan-African movement. The term "left" is necessary in this case to distinguish between Pan-Africanists who believe the driving force of progressive change is the most oppressed and exploited members of society from those who believe traditional elites and politicians can deliver that change. Without the emergence of broad-based popular alliances organized around agrarian reform and a government that can provide widespread social protections, Africa will likely continue to have scenes of discriminate carnage and extreme poverty. I hope that my African friends and allies will answer the challenge. Africa is in need of a revolution, not a renaissance.

REFERENCES

1. Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject- Chapter Eight Conclusion: Linking the Urban and the Rural

2. Sam Moyo and Paris Yoros. The Resurgence of Radical Nationalism in the South Atlantic

Making Sense of Iran: A Political Economy in Transition

The Islamic Republic of Iran shares many of the same problems facing other countries in the global South. The economy is largely underdeveloped, highly dependent on one export commodity, and the state is unable to meet many of the lingering demands of the population. These contradictions in the political economy of development in Iran serve as the backdrop of the ongoing nuclear debate, the controversial re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and relationship with the rest of the Muslim world.

The historical origins of Iran's current development process began before the Islamic regime existed. Mohammad Rezā Shāh Pahlavi was the Western-backed ruler of Iran whose legendary mis-management of Iranian society and economy led to the Iranian revolution of 1979. He was the last monarch of the House of Pahlavi of the Iranian monarchy. The shah of Iran initiated a series of economic and social reforms that modernized the country and set a new course for full integration into the world-economy.

But the shah also widened class-lines and sharply divided Iran into a dual society characterized by structural inequalities between the rich and poor. On the one hand were elites with close linkages with the oil industry and on the other religious clergy, rural masses, and the middle-class. This contradiction caused Iran to be dependent on oil exports and imports of expensive manufactured products. Iranians viewed the shah as largely corrupt and unable to provide basic services in education, health care and housing. The shah purchased billions of dollars in US arms building up a level of regional military might to control vital oil lifelines and exert influence in the region. Economically, the US used Iran as an economic proxy and supplier of a cheap flow of oil to the Western world. A US intelligence official once remarked,

"Iran in the 1970's was widely regarded as a significant regional if not global, power. The United States relied on it, implicitly if not explicitly, to ensure the security and stability of the Persian Gulf sector and the flow of oil from the region to the industrialized Western world on Japan, Europe, and the United States, as well as to lesser powers elsewhere."

The Iranian revolution of 1979 caused the once reliable proxy for Western influence in the middle-east to delink from the economic order, and carve out its own autonomous path toward industrialization. The revolution also sought to reverse the dual economy of the shah on behalf of the popular classes of the nation. The Iranian revolution and movement toward socio-economic transformation frightened many business professionals, technocrats and industrialists who fled to countries in the West. Many of these emigrants have been the source of external pressure on the Islamic Regime to reform.

Since coming to power though the Islamic regime has had to face perpetual economic crisis. The causes of the crisis varied from regional war, misdirected state priorities, and economic sabotage by the U.S. In the 20 years following the Iranian revolution, per capita income declined by 45 percent and inflation remained around 20 to 30 percent every year. Unemployment rose to as high as 20 percent as new entrants to the labor force could simply not find jobs in the heavily export-oriented domestic economy. As a result some 3 millions Iranians have emigrated to other countries. The rural to urban migration in Iran rapidly intensified as well with the capital city of Tehran growing from 4.5 million to 12 million people putting an enormous strain of public service delivery.

The Iranian government has continued to collect most of its non-tax revenues from exporting oil to consumer markets around the world. But despite attempts to diversify the economy, Iran has remained vulnerable to price shocks in the international petroleum market. The weakening of demand in wealthier industrialized nations during the current recession has further exposed Iran's dependency on oil to develop. Iran has failed to successfully raise oil production to collect greater state revenues. To raise production the Islamic Republic will need greater capital investment and intensive drilling technologies. In recent years, Iran has sough to improve relations with the European Union as a potential ally in the development of undercapitalized domestic petroleum.

Even with the economic crisis the Islamic regime was able to score some notable achievements of redistribution including public-spending for infrastructure development including roads, schools, and public libraries. Unlike the former shah, the Islamic regime also prioritized rural development extending running water and electricity to more than half of the villages. The regime successfully carried out a popular ambitious agrarian reform agenda confiscating half a million hectares of arable land to peasant farmers.

Most recently the administration of President Ahmadinijad has generated support from many due to his populist distributional policies within Iran. In response to energy shortages, Ahmadinejad began rationing fuel, and increasing state subsidies for items like sugar and cooking oil. During the first-term President Ahmadinejad, the Iranian government also radically increased the amount of public spending on construction. All of the increased spending kept the economy from total collapse but never tackled the profound level of dependency on oil and created a high level of inflation. Both of these problems are root concerns of the liberal opposition movement.

Reformist rivals of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad saw the last two presidential election cycles as opportunities to reverse the past statist economic policies of the government. These opponents had expected the Islamic regime to phase out public subsidies and liberalize the Iranian economy for the first time since the 1979 revolution. The president before Ahmadinejad, Muhammad Khatami was supported by the disaffected urban middle-classes, college educated professionals and labor movement who were looking for a change of course. The reformers were distraught at the landslide run-off election which elected Ahmadinejad in 2005. President Ahmadinejad's support from some ultra-conservative Iranian political parties and the poor led to a resounding mandate and presented a major setback to the reformist movement. The recent 2009 elections were seen as fraudulent by the reformists who looked forward to regaining their momentum.

Despite the television images of political repression of protests there is some support within the Islamic regime for liberal change. The reformist movement in Iran also consists of high-level clerics and many of their aims were supported by the Supreme Leader himself. In 2006, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered the government to sell 80 percent of all state-owned enterprises in order to increase economic efficiency. Most clerics in Iran actually favor the conventional capitalist model of economic development. They widely support privatization of state-industries, and the development of the private sector.

However, others view such economic liberalization as an attack against the fundamental character of the Islamic revolution. These so called "hardliners" believe that maintaining tight economic control is essential to the political and social continuity of the Islamic regime. Like President Ahmadinejad, they favor central-planning, state industries, national self-reliance and a development agenda that includes poverty eradication, land redistribution, and employment in line with the objectives of the 1979 revolution.

The reformists have explicitly opposed the allocation of scarce resources to support militant Islamist forces throughout the middle-east. Groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine have all been sponsored by the Islamic regime in Iran. One of the most influential moves by Iran to support such groups was the creation of the infamous al-Quds force, a highly specialized unit of Iran's military which organizes, trains, and finances Islamic revolutionary movements. The United States military has waged a series of intense counter-operations in order to neutralize key leaders within the organization and slow-down their operations.

The al-Quds Day – literally Jerusalem Day – was created by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,at the founding of the Islamic regime, and is commemorated on the last Friday of Ramadan in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle for national liberation. During the last weeks events the "Green Movement" of reformists marched through the streets chanting "Not Gaza, Not Lebanon. We are ready to die for Iran," in a direct challenge to the purpose of the gathering its self. There have been previous chants of "Death to Russia" by the reformists as well indicating a deep suspicion of the strategically close relationship between Russia and Iran. The reformists would rather see the Islamic regime focus on domestic economic and political reform than seeking to play spoiler to US hegemony in the middle-east. Many reformists believe that Iran's counter-hegemonical posture has isolated it economically and are convinced that a softening of the country's posture in the eyes of the US could help the economy.

The evolving political saga in Iran signals an intensification of a debate surrounding the nation's distributional policies. The reformists major aim was not to overthrow the Islamic regime, nor to challenge its fundamental structure. Rather the reform movement is mostly seeking to liberalize the political economy of Iran, improve ties with the United States and end financial support for resistance movements in the middle-east. The response of the Islamic regime to these internal pressures for reform will likely define Iran's development path moving forward. In the final analysis, the success or failure at which the Iranian government manages the national economy could be the most important determiner of the country's future.

Honduras, Haiti and the Struggle for Popular Democracy

When I heard the news from Honduras that democratically elected Manuel Zelaya was kidnapped in a coup, there was a 5 second delay before I thought about Haiti. In 2004, the democratically- elected president of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide was also violently overthrown in a similar US-supported coup and taken hostage by military forces. Each coup was more than an action against a sitting president, but were counter-revolutions by elites aimed at silencing popular movements for social and economic change. We can't let them win.

In Honduras Sunday, the military took over the government television station, a curfew was imposed, and the Venezuelan, Cuban, and Nicaraguan Ambassadors were also kidnapped and detained. According to the New York Times, the only people permitted to have access to information were the wealthy with access to the internet. President Manuel Zelaya told Telesur from Costa Rica that he was kidnapped in his pajamas and told if he refused to hang up the cell phone, he would be shot. Zelaya was largely supported by organized labor and the poor. The referendum was expected to succeed by popular mandate---hence the violent reaction by elites who wanted to prevent the voting altogether. The referendum was bitterly opposed by the Honduran upper-classes who feared Zelaya would extend his four- year term limit and transform political inequalities in their representative system.

Choosing not to use violent revolution, a host of popularly elected leaders in Latin America are using the ballot box to empower the poor and working class. The most powerful weapon in their arsenal until now has been the referendum, which allows citizens to vote on constitutional reforms aimed at redistributing power and influence. Honduran president Manuel Zelaya, and Haiti's Bertrand Aristide had taken calculated risks, upsetting historical elites who for years have used the constitution to protect their private wealth and influence.

Today in Haiti, the same entrenched elites that staged the 2004 coup have united against former president Aristide's party, Fanmi Lavalas, by banning them from running candidates in the next election. They fear that the massive support which the party continues to enjoy could lead to a broader movement toward popular democracy in the poorest country in the western hemisphere. In response, the Lavalas party has called for a successful boycott of the elections which are clearly illegitimate without their participation.

In 2002, the democratically elected president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez was also overthrown briefly before a popular movement and resistance in the military restored him to power. There is a widely circulated video on the internet called The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, which highlights how the US and Venezuelan media were culprits in fomenting the anti-democratic actions of domestic elites.

Much the same thing is happening in both Honduras and Haiti, where popular movements for justice are all to often silenced by violent reactionary force from people with tremendous historical privilege and power. In the United States of America, there needs to be more forums that allow popular movements in Latin America to express their struggle among those of among us with a conscience and heart for the poor and exploited.